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OVERCOMING POVERTY, APPROACHING DISTRIBUTIONAL EQUITY
From Absolute Poverty Toward Relative Equality
Tanzania's policy commitment to overcoming absolute poverty - or lack of 
basic material needs (food, water, clothing, shelter, education, medical care, 
transport, reasonably remunerative self employment or employment) - dates to 
its founding. Arguably that commitment has evolved and been articulated 
ratuer than changing sharply. Certainly 19G1-67 saw relatively limited 
progress toward reduction in absolute poverty - the 1S6S/67 Economic Survey 
argued that real rural income per capita had declined since independence,^ 
the very real gains in health, water and education had passed by a sub­
stantial majority of peasants especially in the poorer districts. This 
as not a matter of deliberate urban or middle income bias; however, but 
of failure.to change programme design and technical outlook enough to 
achieve implementation of a very real objective.
vTrcrcoming absolute poverty is not - on the face of it - a very radical aim, 
Adsn Smith, for example, firmly placed it as central to his philosophy for 
increasing the wealth of nations arguing that no nation could be great 
or wealthy the majority of whose population are poor and miserable.
However, serious commitment to absolute poverty eradication within decades 
(an opposed to generations) is a radical political economic choice for six
rather different but interrelated reasons:
I. it contradicts the post-Smithian classical, the neo-classical, the 
Marxian, the monetarist and - le33 clearly perhaps - the Keynesian 
economic orthodoxies. In each production - accumulation - growth 
-re central while consumption is either a necessary evil, a tool for
achieving full employment, or a trickle down 'good' tc be .. -
after high growth and relatively high levels of productive fcrcc-r 
have been attained. Serious economic arguments for absolute poverty 
eradication at global level are very recent flowing iron President 
McNamara's initiative at the World Bank and the ILO's World Employment
O
Programme. These post-date several sorious Third World commitments
to placing increases in the well being of the poor first eg China,
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Kerala State in India, Sri Lenka, Taiwan, Singapore and Tanzania.
2. in the context of low initial levels of productive forces absolute 
poverty eradication as a medium term goal requires achieving substantial 
increase in per capita output of poor peasants and workers if it is
not to hold investment to levels inadequate to sustain the growth
needed to raise the whole population out of poverty.
3. in particular — barring special circumstances (eg massive capital 
inflows - public or private - with relatively low subsequent income flews 
to external providors which do trigger very high growth rates and 
rapdily growing wage employment in medium to high productivity sectors) 
which did not exist in Tanzania - continuing progress toward absolute 
poverty eradication with a moderate growth rate of productive forces 
requires ceilings on personal incomes (or at any rate on personal 
consumption). ie, equity considerations apart, resources adequate to 
allow a substantial upper middle and upper income group do not exist.
4. further the sane moral and social outlook which condemns absolute
poverty at least tends to view very substantial income inequal-ty as
unjust. This flows not from a n t i - c o n s umptiottiso but from the contrast 
between abject poverty and influence.
5. Therefore, the policies needed to sustain a poverty eradication 
programme include progressive taxation, a relatively compressed wage 
and salary structure, limited investment in producing amenity (and 
espcially luxury) goods and services, few consumer amenity goods imports. 
As the programme gathers momentum these constraints are likely to need
to bocomo tighter not more relaxed.
6. As a result participation by workers and peasants in decision taking 
and enforcement is essential if the programme is to be kept on course.
They are its main beneficiaries whereas upper or middle income group 
members (including most middle and upper managers, professionals, 
government officials and political leaders as well as large peasants 
and private businessmen) could, apparently, in the short run at least, 
do better under rather different programmes. In addition to participation, 
mobiilsation/education/consciousness raising of the upper and middle 
income professional,managerial and political sub-classes (on socialist, 
egalitarian and/or nationalist bases) is needed to sustain morale and 
commitment. This is a much more complex political requirement than 
that confronting a state (capitalist or socialist) following a more 
orthodox development via growth with well rewarded elites and a trickle 
down approach to poverty eradication. This particular political 
contraint does not apply in the very high growth cases (eg Singapore) 
and in those in which an external threat can be used to justify con­
servative populist/nationalist poverty eradication programmes (eg 
Taiwan).
This particular set of relationships between overcoming poverty and achieving
relative equality of incomes, access to services and participation certainly
5was not perceived in this way prior to 1967 and probably not prior to 1971. 
TANUs commitment to reducing inequalities initially had two elements: 
reducing the very great inequality between foreigners in Tanzania and 
Tanzanians (especially Tanzanians of African ancestry)^ and reducing 
inequality by seeing that the poor became less poor and less excluded from 
public services.
A fairly early addition was the concept of holding upper incomes - at least
those directly controlled by the state - constant while the poor caught up.
In part this did turn on the perceived impossibility of raising government
salaries and upper wages rapidly at the same time serives were expanded rapidly. 
By 1965 the rapid increases in urban wages were perceived by the government as 
highlighting another inequality problem - urban/rural. By the time of Mwongozo 
in 1971 the need to ensure participation by the poor to back up the poverty 
eradication policy's counterpart of stagnant (soon to be decreasing) real 
income for at least public sector salary earners was perceived as, after the 
1973 National Assembly protest against income policy in general (nominally
g
against the Income Tax Bill ), was the real danger of attempts to.reverse or 
erode the policy.
What TANU considers an acceptable degree of inequality in post-tax personal
income is unclear. It has never taken a stand for absolute equality or agaii.st
incentives including annual increments, promotion to higher scales. Bonus 
debates have turned not on the morality or appropriateness of bonuses for 
performance but how they could be related to actual worker improvements in 
effort/effectiveness and formulated to reduce inequality (eg flat bonus per 
worker or graduation less than wage and salary peak). Similarly agricultural 
price debates have always treated incentives as a positive thing and serious 
arguments for compulsory, low price procurement polciies have been notable 
by their absence (a situation markedly different from the post 1930 USSR or
Gfrom China ). The present pro tax inequality between minimum wage and top 
managerial salaries in the public sector is about 10:1, while post tax it is
7 :l.10 This is now viewed as moderately too great but more - it would seem -
because real purchasing power at minimum wage level is both lew and lower than 
in 1974 because of the 7:1 ratio (very low in world terms) itself.
Poverty, Equality and Redistribution
Unlike European social democracy, TANU policy and government practice 
to overcoming equality has never turned on consumption trar.^ . r
TANU's - and notEbly the President's - emphasis on the duty of all able bodied 
Tanzanians to work (paralleled by a duty on the state to ensure that they have 
the means for self employment or employment) is in terns which sound more like 
the European capitalist state conservative or the European socialist state 
party bureaucrat than like social democrats or liberals. Part of the explanation 
lies in the simple perception that Tanzania cannot now afford substantial 
consunption transfer paycent3. Part, however, seems to stem from a commitment 
to comnon effort (quite consistent with poverty eradication and egalitarianism 
since in that context all gain - except the initially very rich and/or exploiters) 
and - in some cases - to a belief that work is an integral expression of 
humanity especially when in a social context.
Redistribution can be divided into three categories:
a. primary - which increases the power to produce and to be rewarded for 
production of certain sub-classes (in this case workers and peasants) 
absolutely, relative to and sometimes at the expense of other sub-classes 
(in this case capitalists and, in particular, foreign ones);
b. secondary - which provides increased access to basic public and communal 
services on a basis whereby the poor (or the rich if it were a negative 
redistribution as is apparently the case with Harambee secondary and 
technical achoolds and was so with some co-op subsidised TAPA secondary 
schools) receive more services than they pay taxes either because the tax 
structure is progressive or the inequality in access to services is less 
than that in pre-tax income or (as in Tanzania) both;
c. tertiary - which comprises consumption transfers eg unfunded pensions from 
the state (other than to its own ex-employees), income supplements, food 
subsidies, famine relief.
Tanzanian public sector resource allocations have concentrated on the first two 
not the third. The rural (agricultural and broader) investment and recurrent 
spending (except TRDB credit) is on balance skewed toward redistribution within the
rural sector and certainly from urban to rural. Most of the major . . . .  
programmes - primary and adult education, water, health - clearly represent
secondary redistribution. As more education and better health do tend to raise
productivity, the borderline between these categories is less than clear. Similarly 
minimum wage, consumer price and grower price policy to the extent it reduces 
the share of poor worker or peasant income going to other sub-classes/sectors
is also a fona of primary redistribution.
Tertiary redistribution has had only one substantial element throughout lt'ol-8*
- 'famine' (rural weather disaster) relief. Pensions have been paid by employers 
not by a redistributed national transfer system. Subsidies on consumer gcod^ 
have been opposed - the major cases have been transitional (eg sugar and gr-ín in 
1974 while price adjustments were made), or the result of incompetance in _-iv_e 
setting (eg rice at one point in the 1970''s but much more seriously grain from 
1977/78 on as a result of NMC's deteriorating physical and financier cort-ol).
1980 and 1981 do show substantial maize subsidies and 1981/82 little 
despite a 100% increase in sembe prices but - unlike Sri Lanka over 1S45-* 7 
food subsidies are not seen either as central to redistribution and poverty 
eradication or even as desirable."^*-
Egalitarianism. Growth, Self Reliance and Socialism
While - especially in Mwongozo13- Tanzania policy accepts that progress toward
egalitarianism is more basic than maximum growth, there is no acceptance that
the two always or even normally conflict. That perception lies behind me
emphasis in the Arusha Declaration that the wealth of Tanzania comprises
Tanzanians and land and in the Presidents stress on hunan be.ngs as -.... .
Justification of an means to development. Recent empirical evidence bears ej.
this perception - there is no evidence that greater inequality is necess»-./ -~r,
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sufficient to achieve, or normally associated with higher gro
As Tanzania's 1961-78 growth record is above average for a .-cu
sub-suharan African) economy, it is hard to argue that egalitarianism has retarded 
growth relative to that under a totally different strategy. What is much less 
clear is the degree to which particular policies pursued for egalitarian reasons 
have reduced achieved growth within the actual strategy and the degree to 
which these losses have been ineffectual or avoidable in terms of progress toward 
poverty eradication and increased distributional equity.15 This is a critical 
question because growth — given the egalitarianism goal — is necessary for its 
fulfilment; redistribution of existing Tanzanian personal and communal consumption 
on the basis of absolute quality would (quite apart from incentive or equity 
consideration) not result in all households being above any resonable definition 
of minimum acceptable personal consumption and access to basic public services.
Egalitarianism is integral to self reliance at the household, village and - 
perhaps - organised labour levels. Unless personal income is adequate to meet 
basic personal consumption needs, a household is integrally dependent in its 
relationships to those who provide markets, goods, loans, services. Unless a 
village is able to meet its basic consumption needs (directly or through sales 
and purchases, whether primarily on a household or on a mixed household/communal 
basis) and to provide a substantial volume of communal investment, its relations 
with outside public and private agencies will be structurally dependent.
Probably, the degree of dependence of labour forces vis a vis employers is also 
greater the lower their incomes. Clearly egalitarianism is not a sufficient 
condition for self reliance - participation via strong Party branches, Village 
Councils, Workers Councils etc. is also essential. However, unless the workers 
and peasant members of these bodies are or are approaching freedom from absolute 
poverty their power to control them and to act decisively vis a vis managers, 
professionals and bureaucrars is highly problematic.
In Tanzania socialism is normally defined as including participation and 
egalitarianism. Therefore, frcn a Tanzanian perspective overcoming absolute 
poverty and reducing inequality in personal incomes and in access to public
services ore seen as integral components of transition to socially and progress 
toward them as critical tests of how that transition is faring. This is a 
perfectly reasonable definition and one consistent with much of Marx's writings 
as well as with many of Chairman Mao’s. However, it is critical to note that 
it is not the dominant operational definition of socialism in socialist Europe 
which has taken a much narrower view of participation and of the meaning of 
distributional equity.16 In that respect TANU’s post 1967 stance is in many 
respects more similar to that of Solidarity than to that of the pre-19Sl Polish 
Communist Party. One evident problem with this definition in its simple form 
is that under conditions of very slov>_y growing GDP the test of significant 
(or even positive) progress toward overcoming absolute poverty cannot be passed 
and that of increased access to (operational) basic public services is problematic 
even if distributional equity is increasing. Further, under these conditions 
opportunities for open exploitation and statutorily illegal income generation 
- the most bitterly resented forms of inequality - increase.
R e d u c i n g /Removing Severe Poverty
Programmes to reduce poverty have had two foci corresponding to what President 
Nyerere has described as the citizen's two purses - his personal consuming 
power and his access to publicly provided services. In the case of villageisation 
the two strands intertwine - albeit the actual context of government programmes 
has been service weighted - but other instruments have normally operated on one 
or the other with a highly progressive (taking services and uses together) 
fiscal policy linking them.
The major specialized instruments for poverty reduction have been minimum rages, 
producer prices and improvement of opportunities to produce for sale and 
expansion of basic health, water and education services. Urban minimum v .. 
were increased 250% in nominal and 100% in real terms over 1961-74 with relatively 
parallel movement in urban informal sector incomes and most other v .. . . 7:.-.
problem is that this success has been eroded. 1974 marked . . i
consumption power of the minimum wage and the highest average per capita con­
sumption power for the urban sector. Over 1974-81 the minimum wage was raised 
absolutely from Sh. 340 to Sh. 600 a month (vs Sh.95 to Sh.340 in the 1961-74 period) 
but the 76% nominal increase was well below the increase in cost of living.
The minimum wage is only secondarily relevant to peasant households (although 
up to one fifth of their total income is from wages). Levels of production for 
own use (crops, livestock, housing, infrastructure to improve crop output, 
storage or marketing) and of both production and prices of sold production are 
critical. Here pre-1974 policy tended to concentrate on production oriented 
inputs (rather uneven geographically, biased against food crops and in the 
case3 of extension and research not self evidently giving value for money) 
and on transport and marketing facilities (with clearer positive results), 
agricultural price policy was ad hoc and not very clearly linked either to 
selective production stimulation or peasant poverty reduction.
Until 1967 peasant real incomes stagnated. To 1974 they increased substantially
(partly because of improved rural/urban terms of trade over 1967-70 and again
in 1974-75). 1974 was marked by systematic use of grower prices to reduce
17poverty and achieve selective production increases. This approach fell into 
chaos over 1975-78 but was revived over 1979-81.
While support for production - especially fertilizer and specialized extension
services - were enhanced over 1974-81, the actual effect is in most ca3es unclear.
For coffee it has been crucial, in tobacco and tea it has limited output per
farmer losses relating to agronomic factors. Otherwise inputs - except for
18eeed in some cases - are both uneven and overall relatively low. Improved 
procurement in respect to grains did raise peasant incomes and the losses from 
bad storage have, in practice, fallen largely on the urban sector. However, post 
1973 deterioration in transport and endemic shortages (leading to empty shelves 
and/or 'pro-magendo' prices) have hit the peasant sector's cash transactions
particularly hard. For food crops (especially if one includes t.
official prices) rural/urban terns of trade improved over 1974/80, for industrial
/export crops they worsened.
The underlying growth rate in peasant agriculture of over 4% and the relative-;/ 
good terms of trade here meant that following the 1973/and 1974/75 drought, 
peasant incomes and purchasing power recovered to a new high in 1977/73 perhaps 
10% per capita above its previous 1972/73 high. Since then bad weather - and 
more rapid inflation - plus the end of the coffee boom - have led to a recuction 
probably of 5% in real terms for the sector but over 12.5% per capita given 
population growth.
The picture on the private purse side is then one of modest but substantial 
progress until 1974 for poor urban workers and until 1978 for peasants, ba. 
substantial subsequent falls. These have to a large extent turned on the 12i% 
loss of real purchasing power of GDP over 1972-75 from external terms of trade 
shifts, briefly clawed back at the peak of the 1976/77 beverage boom but 
followod by a loss of at least 15% over 1977/81.“° As a result an average 
rate of increase in per capita constant price output of about 4.5* c.e. - <- 
has been cut to under 3% (below the rate of growth of population) by external 
terms of trade losses.
Access to Public Services
Pre 1967 public service expansion tended to be urban and upper income g-c-y 
- in practice albeit ’ not in intent. This related in part to emphasis 
education on secondary and tertiary to citizenize the state and productive sct-tc. 
senior posts and in part to the almost insuperable problems o- prov-v g 
to a rural population dominantly in scattered households. Tnat said there 
an inertial bias toward slightly modified industrial economy models - applicable 
only in cities and, even there, only for middle and upper income groups 
especially in housing, health and water.
From tho early 1970's the f cus was shifted to universal access to water, 
primary education, health and adult education. Sanitation (pit latrines) was 
a separate campaign. It falls either under exhortation or health education us 
the physical inputs to achieve the shift from 16% to 45% or better access to pit 
latrines were wholly iron the users. Housing is a target area but public sector 
housing is recognised to be unable to cope with more than a fraction of urban
demand and ¿o be laigely irrelevant to rural, and the impact of low cost housing
support, provision of training and tools to colleges for housing improvement 
and urban site and service schemes while not negligible is very far from 
becoming general.
Water supply under public programmes now reaches at least 10,000,000 Tanzanians 
(7,000,000 rural) and the number served is growing 400,000 a year excluding 
increased use of existing facilities with population growth. The 1961 figure 
W'as of the order of 750,000. With greater emphasis since 1976 on local partici­
pation in construction and maintenance, tho 1991 universal access target may
nearly be met. Even mere critical is whether with this approach the very high 
per cent of out of order systems can be reduced.
Primary education (for the full six year cycle) will reach near universality by 
1SS4/85 with about 2,750,000 - 3,000,000 students versus 500,000 in the 1960's 
and under 1,000,000 even in the early 1970's. Adult illiteracy has been reduced 
from S0% at independence to 20%. While continuing adult education has slackened 
somewhat since the mid 1970’s, a wide variety of facilities and courses are 
provided including a series of full development colleges with courses oriented 
to (and partly chosen by) villages.
Medical services have expanded primarily at rural medical centre and urban out­
patient clinic level on the curative front, by vaccination campaigns on the 
preventive and by nutrition and child and mother care on the educational- 
preventative front. The average annual number of visits per Tanzanian to a
medical facility is 4 (perhaps 3 in rural and up to 10 in urban areas). This 
service is - at basic level - now actually accessible to about 90% of the 
population (100% urban, 85% rural). However foreign exchange constraints have 
reduced availability of drugs and supplies faster than better organisation 
of purchases and prescription lists have been able to improve efficiency in 
their use leading to a decline in quality of service since 1979.
Urban services have declined in quality and - because of fund constrai nts on 
extensions to new areas rather than public policy on services - in percentage 
of urban population covered particularly in newly opened low income areas.
While the deterioration is sometimes linked to the 1972 abolition of urban 
councils (a factor in thoir 1979 reinstatement) the basic cause is the tighter 
post 1974 budgetary position combined with continued top priority to moving 
toward universal access to basic services in rural areas.
While through 1981 the record on basic service provision remains one of 
quantitative progress - overall and rurally but not in some urban areas - 
deterioration in maintenance and operating inputs has reduced quality dangerously. 
1981/82 - 1983/84 constraints on the capital (development) budget are likely 
to slow, but not halt, quantitative growth. Whether enough leeway in the 
Recurrent Budget can be found to restore operating input and maintenance levels 
to 1974 or 1978 standards (in themselves barely adequate) is more problematic.
As with the loss of ground on eliminating the personal income face of poverty, 
this is not a matter of priority shifts but of resource constraints.
Basic Hunan Needs Absolute Poverty, Equity, Egality
As underscored earlier Tanzania did not adopt a "Basic Needs" approach because 
it had become fasionable. At least in the case of the ILO the causal direction 
is the other way - Tanzanian experience was heavily drawn upon (whether always
accurately may be another matter) in formulating the ILO approach to tisic 21
As perceived by Tanzania these needs are:
a. adequate earned personal incomes for all households to meet basic 
personal consumption needs - a result requiring both adequate levels of 
productivity by workers and peasants and equitable levels of remuneration 
in relation to productivity and the cost of basic consumption goods;
b. universal access to basic public services;
c. opportunities for employment or self employment for all able bodied 
Tanzanians at levels of productivity and remuneration (income) compatible 
with the first need;
d. participation in decision taking and implementation by workers and peasants 
to preserve commitment to the other goals,and to mobilize worker and 
peasant involvement in action directed toward achieving them;
e. creation of an adequate economic policy and institutional Infrastructure 
- including investible surplus, tax revenue, foreign exchange-to sustain 
growth in productive force levels - needed to allow substantial progress.
The participation goal/need is treated in a separate chapter while the "broad 
infras tracture" one is central to both the political economic goals and macro
economic record chapters.
The employment/self employment goal has never been fully articulated - primarily 
because urban unemployment rates have tended to be below 10%, urban wage employ­
ment - at least until 1975 - rose at least as rapidly as urban population, the 
'informal' (urban low and middle income self employed) sector has real incomes 
for most members fairly near the minimum wage and was much smaller than the 
'formal' urban wage earning sector, and most employment was necessarily rural 
self employment.
Whatever overstaffing ha3 occurred in the public (and for that matter the private) 
sector — anc in some cases it is substantial — does not relate to public policy
except to the extent the overstaffing is the result of a fall ir. .
output and its short term 'solution' would require non-voluntary re nun ....r.ci c 3 .
In general low - often inadequate - attention has been paid to employment
impact of technological and institutional choices; in construction with negative
22impact on employment, cost and import content.
Articulating and overall employment/self employment strategy may or a«j not oe
a high priority. But, developing guidelines for testing a*ternat-\c - >- ^  ■
and institutional approaches and applying these guidelines at progra_~e, p-.--c.:
and project level is a priority. The advantages of wells over bc¿e^olej
(where technically suitable) in terms of intitial cost, feasibility o. n-* .a,.Ou.
and attainable level of local involvement are now clear - conscious _pp-i~¿
of employment (or self employment) criteria might have hastened th.**. ronua.,
Recurrent vague ideas (fortunately never seriously acted upon) c- grww-n0
stantial quantities of maize'03 on large, mechanized farms are, at pra-tice,
technically/institutionally unsound, cost ineffective and prohi-iwivt-j
expensive in foreign exchange terms. But their ultimate inappropr.a.e-e
that, if effective, they would render a quarter of Tanzania s pea.,.
Guidelines for testing agricultural policies and projects in term- c_  ^ --
and negative inpact on employment and self employment are i cdtc
avoid embarking on major structural errors but also to evaluate p.ope-
alternative ways of implementing them) whose impact on employment,  ^ P >
nor determined bymont and overall poverty reduction can neither be intuit®
, . J 24simple inspection.
/_-tt>-lal eoods, marketed The private and public purse aspects of basic needs (.mate*
nrivate) at first glanceservices or non-mobilised services whether public or
artnalitv or even to equity in do not appear to require substantial attention to eqcu*iw
j M »r 1961-67 Tanzania's the sense of limiting inequality. Indeed, as noted,
tecess backed by gradualattempted implementation turned on formal eqaulity oi
-i«cific regard to whether, expansion of productive and social services without spec
or w h a t .preparation actually reached poor peasants and workers. From 1967 the
inadequacy of this approach was recognised.
On the "public purse" poverty eradication side this took the form of strategies 
for achieving universal access to basic services. On the "private purse" side 
it centred on minimum wages and - less coherently or consistently - grower 
p.ices p..us inputs of goods, services (eg procurement) and knowledge to raise 
grower productivity and incomes.
however, in the context of scarce resources, these priorities forced greater 
attention to articulating policies related to acceptable degrees of inequality, 
and to controls on actions which either threatened the realisation of absolute 
poverty reduction,or offended against the ethics of distributional equity by 
flaunting unequal income,in the form of very overt consumption of goods beyond 
the reach of the vast majority of Tanzanians for the present and for the 
reasonably foreseeable future.
Thu3 the intitial policy of salaries standing still while w'ages caught up - 
which over 1961-1970 was quite consistent with most individual salary earners 
receiving substantial increases in real purchasing power through a combination 
of increments and promotion- came to be inadequate as a guideline. Similarly 
price management by 1973 became necessary to balance the need to prevent minimum 
-.«age Increases (and indeed almost any economic shock) primarily benefitting 
retailers, while also preserving adequate flows of investable surplus - especially 
in manufacturing and wholesaling. Finally, the systematic use of tax measures 
as redistributive devices developed beginning with the 1970 substitution of 
sale3 tax (at least two thirds urban incidence) for graduated local rate (wholly 
rural incidence) and the broad patzern of rates (including zero rate on basic 
food) adopted in the Sales Tax.
Tanzania’s stress on overcoming absolute poverty and reducing inequality has
sometimes been misinterpreted either as asceticism or as an acceptance o*
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permanent extreme poverty. Neither reading is accurate. The 'n*i 
poverty aspect is exactly the reverse - a condemnation of material deprivation 
leading to the direction of resources and mobilisation of effort to overcome it. 
The equity/equality aspect is dominated by a concern for distributive justice 
perceived as the limitation of the share of scarce resources consumed by a small 
number while many remain in, or barely above, absoluto poverty The-c- is 
potential anti-consumerist line in some Tanzanian leaders’statements, but this 
relates dominantly either to goods which cannot be available to ail ~r 
majority of Tanzanians within this century, or to the growth of clearly 
inessential consumption by the affluent industrial world minority of * --• c---rt’ ~ 
population, which prejudice resource availability to Poor countries and their 
peoples. It does not relate to any opposition to substantial increases 
in per capita consumption nor over time adding items - eg bicycles, radios 
sewing machines, fans, ice boxes/refrigerators, windows, leather shoes - to 
the typical household consumption basket.
Toward Lesser Income Ine-qiiality
Action in respect to income distribution can be considered in two * - • 
programme and policy instruments used; trends and patterns. It is convenient 
to treat programmes and instruments first with brief references to impact 
followed by a review of the relatively incomplete and somewhat subjective data 
available on trends and patterns.
The major programme/policy instruments fall into six clusters:
a. fiscal (revenue and expenditure);
b. wages, salaries, firnge benefits;
c. prices (grower and user, subsidies, relative price structure);
d. controls over conspicuous consumption;
e. limiting opportunities for exploitation;
f. raising low income individual/group productivity and/or accc.-
self employment.
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The last three clusters are cot usually seen as part of egaliterean income 
distribution policy (albeit the sixth is perceived as oriented to poverty 
eradication). However, they are of considerable relevance to achieved levels 
of income, to perceptions of inequality and to actual opportunities for low 
income groups (and especially new labour force entrants) to achieve consumption 
standards out of earned income at least near the minimum wage level. The 
first three clusters form the core of income distribution policy proper, 
but have been touched on in other chapters and will be reviewed relatively 
briefly in the present context.
Fiscal Policy and Practice
Taxation policy as discussed in the chapter on government revenue and expenditure28 
is progressive both in respect to direct and (by the selection of rates and 
items) Indirect tax. The results are also progressive with respect to income.
In addition, taxation policy is in practice - and, albeit less clearly, in 
principle - structured to give a lower incidence on rural incomes than on urban 
at any level of income. This results primarily from tho large household 
produced/consumed (so called "subsistence") component of rural incomes and from 
the de facto lower rates of income tax on all except the very largest rural
27incomes resulting both from assessment problems por se and from limited personnel.
Expenditure policy and practice are harder to characterize simply,and present 
almost Insuperable barriers to comprehensive quantification. The increased 
stress on universal provision of basic services discussed in the preceeding 
section and on rural development oriented services28 has reduced inequalities 
in services used by income groups and on an urban/rural division.
Allocation of public expenditure by income group poses severe conceptual and 
practical problems. On the order of 50% is not allocable oxcept by heroic 
assumptions eg defense, police, general administration, foreign affairs. Further,
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there are conundrums in allocating on cost versus benefit bases eg police 
protection is relatively most effective for banks, government offices and low 
income residential areas and least effective for private cars, higher income 
residential area3 and tourists. Higher education goes to a group which at mhe 
time has relatively low or relatively high incomes depending on whether one 
treats the cost of education as part of their effective Income; to members of 
families with - on average - moderately above average incomes; to individuals 
whose future incomes will - by virtue of that education - be in the top 1% of 
the income distribution.
Limiting examination to the half of expenditure which is roughly allocable 
suggests a differential between the bottom quartile (lowest quarter) and the 
top decile (highest 10%) of perhaps 4 or 5 to 1. This is substantially less 
than the difference in pre-tax incomes and therefore nalces the -spending (as well 
as the funding) side of government revenue progressive.
The urban/rural impact of spending has beenmore energetically debated.“S Again, 
allocation problems are severe. Quite apart from unallocables such a¿. defense, 
two further conceptual problems arise. Is the question the location Oi. 
expenditure or the beneficiary of expenditure or the recipient of income? ~g 
agricultural higher education is in a town, educates students who are mostly 
rural in origin., pays wages and salaries to urban (and certainly net peasant) 
employees. Rural or urban? Other items are allocable in theory but pose 
practical problems of division, eg roads which carry goods from and to peasants 
(and from and to towns) clearly should be allocated partly to urban and partly 
to rural on a benefit criterion, but how? 50-50? In terms of value oi goods?
On the basis of the moderately simply allocable half of expenditure, the break­
down appears to be 27*-35% rural, 15-22*% urban, with a tendency since 1972 for 
the urban share to fall relative to the rural. This is related to decentralisa­
tion as the Regional and District Administrations have clearly been rural biased
to a rather surprising extent - one of the reasons for restoration of urban 
councils to correct a degree of bias which was contributing to significant
absolute decline in secondary town services.
On the basis o. lot urban and 85% rural population, this suggests a difference in 
expenditure per capita of 2.5 to 4.5:1 in favour of urban. This is substantially 
xcss than the perhaps 8:1 cash income disparity and at least at the lower end 
of the range substantially less than the probable real consumption power inequality
of 4 to 5:1.
¿he recurrent revenue side is clearer. Since the abolition of export tax, rural
contribution to revenue is basically 25 to 30% of sales tax and of taxes on
29transport or 15% odd of public revenue. This is substantially less than the 
rural share in cash - let alone cash and producer consumed-income and also 
substantially less than expenditure in respect to the rural population.
30Alternative estimates turn on differences in respect to capital expenditure 
financed by borrowing. Domestically the dominant sources are currency holdings, 
bank deposits, life insurance premia and pension funds - on balance 75 to 85% 
urban in origin. Externally the question turns on repayment. The superficially 
attractive assumption is that foreign loans are repaid in foreign currency which 
is 80% or more earned from agriculture. This, however, is to confuse revenue 
and foreign exchange. From an incidence point of view,the revenue comes from 
general revenue (85% urban) not direct from export proceeds. The more general 
confusion is between surplus generation/use balance (on which head agriculture 
has a deficit) and foreign exchange generation/use (on which it has a surplus).
The general conclusion from the admitedly weak data is that both revenue and 
expenditure are progressive and also alter the after tax and receipt of services 
income distribution balance in favour of rural areas. Whether they do either 
to an adequate extent is a more open question - the Tanzanian performance is
on revenue progressivity and rural bias relatively unusual (ie revenue is usually 
proportional and the expenditure bias to urban not rural) and both appear to be 
increasing over time with 1969 (sales tax for graduated local rate), 1970/72 
(decentralisation and starting of universal service emphases), 1981 (end of major 
export taxes) involving the sharpest in a series of steps in that direction.
Wages. Salaries, Fringe Benefits,
The relative disparity narrowing nature of wage and salary policy has been
discussed in the previous sections. Its impact on government wages and salaries
- where it is most effective - is presented in the chapter on government revenue 
31and expenditure.
The institutional mechanisms aro multiple:_
a wages tribunal (effectively a government unibunal as labour and employer 
members are advisory) which must examine and approve, modify, or reject all 
proposed changes in wage and salary agreements pertaining to scales and 
bonus agreements except for government employees and which statutorily acts 
within government set criteria;
b. direct statutory adjustment of the minimum wage (and in 1S74 all wages and 
salaries) including the government, parastatal and private sectors;
c. government wage and salary setting on the proposals of the Central Establish­
ments unit of Management Development and/or the Treasury and - except for 
anomaly eliminating adjustments - de facto subject to decision by the
Treasury in terms of the budget related demand/supply/standard of living/
33revenue/expenditure package of proposaxs;
d. parastatal scales related to the government ones with a 10% allowance to 
offset contributory pension (government pensions are non-contributory while 
most - not all - parastatal are contributory) subject to approval and review 
by the Standing Committee on Parastatal Organisations.
In general the system works as intended. However, it is subjec
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leakages and de facto gaps in coverage. Those concerning snail employers 
are probably fairly trivial as far as unathorlsed increases go but - especially 
in respect to casual rural, domestic and small urban commercial establishment 
(eg bars) employment - results in some payments of less than the minimum wage.
Salaries are hard to control because writing up a new post or cadre can result
in effective salary increases and because promotions which in practice create a
top heavy structure are not easy to monitor individually. These constitute a
moderate leakage in central government and most parastatals and a severe leakage
in seme parastatals. In the private sector where formal group salary agreements
do not exist, the present legislation does not apply (or at least has not been
applied) so that for artisans, technicians, professionals, managers,medium and
large private employer scales (and fringe benefits) are in many cases signifi-
34cantly above those of the public sector. This has led to a serious drain of
personnel (despite bonding of trained personnel) at these levels as the
stronger private sector firms prefer to bid away trained personnel (even if they
35have to pay off their bonds) to organising training programmes themselves.
At one point in the 1970's some parastatals had begun to develop a habit of paying 
"unofficial" amounts above agreed contracts - and not registering them. A com­
bination of queries from the Audit Corporation and the Labour Tribunal appears 
to have limited (or eliminated) this practice which is almost certainly either 
Illegal as unathorised expenditure or as unathorised contractual increases 
depending exactly how the payments are arranged and handled.
Productivity incentive payments have been and are a source of some dissent and 
of major practical problems. A brisk debate at the turn of the 1960's/1970's 
- following a high initial bonus payment by the National Bank of Commerce, 
itself a rather extreme example of the productivity, defined as profit, related 
bonuses which the Labour Tribunal was authorised to approve, reached a broad 
consensus:
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productivity related bonuses were consistent with transition to socialism; 
they should relate to additional surplus generated by worker efforts not 
to base levels of surplus or to increases arising frcan other factors (eg 
higher interest rates in bank cases);
they should be distributed on a core equal basis than basic wages and salaries 
- ie flat rate to each worker or limited range of rates of bonus; 
they were to be approved in advance of the year(s) to which they were to 
apply by the Labour Tribunal and to Incorporate clear criteria for oetemir.ing 
what bonus - if any - was payable to then.
In practice this approach has not worked well given the 1974-76 and 1979-61 
contraints on the econony. Profit increases were relatively easy to secure in 
financial institutions — where productivity per person in semi-physical terns
36 ..iprobably did Improve - and because total surplus per employee was ver> nigl.,
even modest percentages of "profit above budgeted target level" lod to proposed
bonuses large enough to cause general resentnent and - in 1980 - a call for a
rethinking of the system. Profit levels elsewhere depended so heavily on
import availability (related to the perceived macro Importance of the firm),
on rate of increase of import costs (since price management tendea to cause prent
37
falls if input cost increases were sharply above projections) and degree c. 
interruption of water - power - transport that relating achieved versus turgctea 
or present versus past profits to labour effort/efficiency was virtually 
impossiblo. Nor would physical target ratios provide a way out as at least the 
import and services constraints weighed on achieved physical cut^u-, as 
on achieved surplus.
1981 rethinking of bonus and incentives policy3® does not seem to have overcome 
this problem. Its proposed positive and negative (redundancies, frozen increments 
no promotions) incentives will be demonstrably ua*air if linked t0 overai: 
output or profit changes whatever their cause and almost imposs.o-e -o
compute in relation to labour effort/efficiency except for the most efficient
39enterprises producing critical goods or services and tho most totally 
inept parastatals (eg NMC, TAFICO). Further, it is somewhat difficult to 
impose penalties at all levels if the basic weaknesses are at middle and 
top management level not at that of production and supporting wage earners.
Fringe benefit control is problematic - data are very fragmentary. In the public 
sector fairly strict limitations exist on paper and - except for use of auto­
mobiles - moderately comparably in practice. Use (abuse) of public institution 
vehicles is moderately common and more serious in its psychological impact and 
as evidence of improper conspicuous private consumption at public expense than 
for its overall effect on income distribution which is fairly minor.
The main public sector "fringe benefits" are: contributions toward pensions 
(universal with a relatively standarized parastatal and a uniform government 
scheme), housing provision (uneven by institution and type of employee), sub­
sidised noon meals (a minority of parastatals)/ leave travel allowance, institu­
tional travel to and from work, and institutional medical schemes (a majority 
of parastatals). For a parastatal with fairly generous provision - eg NBC 
19S0-81 - these can add up to two thirds of basic wages and salaries. In this 
case subsisdized noon meals average about 17¿% of basic pay, superannuation and
welfare about 19%, leave passages of the order of 2%, travel to work over 10%,
medical expenses about 3% for a total of 50% before housing costs (basically 
maintenance, depreciation and deemed interest on residential property plus 
secondary rental and rent subsidy items) less rents charged which may be of the 
order of 15% of basic wages and salaries. NBC is atypical - the average for
the parastatal sector nay be of the order of 30% and for the government perhaps
10%.(partly because pensions are paid on a current, not charged on an accrual 
basis, partly because there are no special medical schemes and partly because 
housing stocks are largely rather old and none too well maintained).
Tho effect of fringe benefits on incomo distribution is couple*:
a. in general they widen urban/rural (and certainly peasant/wage earner)
differentials;
b. overall they are, on the face of it, less unequally distributed than wages 
and salaries - clearly true for transport and subsidized meals and pensions 
(because of the minimum level at Sh 480 a month)40 while housing has dual 
peaks for selected low and most upper income public sector employees (tied 
to access to institutional or rent subsidised housing, rather tha~ to *-e 
mildly progressive rent change related to wage (7i%) and salary (10°-) 
levesl)41;
c. however, the payments are so unequal by institution that the presumption
of lesser inequality must be modified, and may be reversed for public sector 
wage and salary earners as a group. First, parastatals in general pay more 
than the government by wage and salary grade for equivalen? jobs and give 
more fringe benefits. Second, the more efficient and higher average wage/ 
salary parastals (notably tho financial institutions) pay higher proportions 
of fringe benefits relative to wages/salaries than those with lower average 
(per capita) wage/salary bills.
For the private sector, neither data nor - beyond collection of income tax 
on the more obvious fringe benefits including use of car and subsidised housing 
- controls exist. In general, it would appear that the relevance of private 
sector fringe benefits to income distribution has not received attention u-d 
that in relation to public sector has not been systematically examined or 
articulated.
Prices, Incomes, Purchasing Power
There are two sides to price management as it related to overcoming absolute
poverty and reducing inequality - grower and consumer. The former has
discussed in the previous section and in the chapters on agricultural producticn 
42and rural development. It has not, in general, boon or let.
intrarural inequality nor very systematically to reducing urban/rural even 
though it has had a decided inpact on that front.
Prices for particular crops could, in theory, be set on the basis of return per 
typical grower household cash income per working year. However, this has not been 
done. Calculations have tended to be per day. As the number of days worked 
on a typical holding varies widely from crop to crop, this approach - even if 
used much more systematically than it has (per day returns for 'typical' growers
show a 4 or 5:1 range for set price crops at 'improved traditional' cultivation
43practice level ) - would not reduce inequality markedly. Further, no pricing 
approach would directly benefit areas whose output was lower (or cost higher) 
for ecological, location or agricultural practice reasons.
On the other hand, uniform 'farmgate' pricing for certain crops plus improved
procurement for a wider range of food crops does create a tendency toward
lesser inequality in rural incomes. This is most marked in border regions
with no major export/industrial crop eg much of Ruvuma, Rukwa, Songea, Klgoma.
In these cases the higher price to growers (resulting from averaging transport
co3ts) and greater availability of buyers have resulted in sharply increased
44commercial sales in both value and volume terms. Jiore generally, domestic
food crop oriented peasants tend to have lower average incomes than those whose
cash crops are industrial/export oriented. Therefore, the increase in the
prices of domestic food relative to export/industrial crops has tended to
reduce income inequality. Over 1067-77 these factors were not enough to prevent
rising rural inequality, but over 1977-81 they have probably contributed to a 
45reduction.
Consumer price control is part of a broader price management structure which is
46also directed to maintaining manufacturer and wholesaler investible surplus.
Tne particular problems of 'windfall gain acquisition' and price ratchet effect 
to economic shocks of the retail sector over 1970-73, lay behind the
creation of the Price Commission to manage prices and jive it - 
tion toward limiting distributive sector margins and especially to averti:.g 
their sudden expansion as a result of real or contrived shortages and unreal 
or overstated cost increases.
The Commission's methodology is pro jected cost plus at specif ied output and efficiency 
levels. The result is a substantially lower level of manufacture/importer price 
increases than applied for and a 1973-30 record of domestic manufactured gooes 
price rises (excluding indirect taxes) below either the cost of inputs or the 
overall cost of living index. Because of greater than anticipated constraints 
on output, 1979 and 1930 surplus results for manufacturers and importers have 
been below levels intended by the Commission for most firms.
Limiting Consplcous Consumption
Limits on what the upper and middle income groups may consume does not 
directly affect the distribution of income. Its probable effect is to diver, 
consumption from one amenity or luxury good to another eg Mercedes and French 
brandy to local brandy, restaurant meals and weekends at Mixumi.
Its main purpose is either to limit flaunted inequality based purely on wealth 
(especially in a context of sharing sacrifices) or to conserve scarce resources 
(especially foreign exchange)/17 The first purpose is illustrated by automobiles 
- the main example of sumptuary legislation.
a. since 1971 to buy an automobile less than four years old requires a permit
Issued on demonstration of a public or social need as well as a prxv ate 
ability to pay:
b. since 1974 there have been restrictions on non-business use on S_^ca>s,
c. a3 of 1981 petrol rationing has been introduced.
The impact is largely psychological. Youths with wealthy parents can no longer
there has been a shift buy new cars and zoom through low income areas (albeit tne*»
to motorbikes and thore aro rackets in two to three year old vehicle acquisition) 
Car owners are visibly cor.strainod in use of the most conapicous of all consumer 
goods. How much foreign exchange - beyond that from limiting saloon car imports 
- has been saved is a very problematic point and has been known to bo in respect 
to decisions on all three restrictions.
Since Id1.4 (somewhat earlier for eg cigarettes, other tobacco products, beer, 
spirits) almost all luxury and amenity goods have received nil foreign exchange 
allocations. This does have the effect of reducing disparity of consumption 
standards in respect to consumer durables (albeit against the younger members 
of each income group as much as between groups, because the older ones, at 
least in respect to consumer durables, have more pre-1974 purchases). It does 
save foreign exchange; albeit carried as far as in Tanzania it also creates 
maximum incentives for smuggling (basically to serve limited upper income 
groups) and for securing official trips abroad (basically a senior civil service/ 
managerial "fringe benefit") to acquire goods. These measures are not usually 
perceived in the context of income distribution.
Limiting Opportunities for Exploitation
One set of limits on opportunities for exploitation have been structural: 
expansion of the public directly productive sector, abolition of large scale 
landlordism, creating a structure of price management, strengthening participa­
tion (vis a vis owners,managers and officials), establishing and largely
enforcing a leadership code that prohibits political leaders and senior public
48sector personnel from significant involvement in the private sector. Until
1974 progress was real, albeit slow, uneven and sometimes hard fought. Since
1974 the main area of gains is in respect to villages where the manipulative
and coercive power of rural elites and government officials vis a vis peasants
49has clearly been weakened. The context of extreme shortages is one in which 
price management at best works inadequately and that of rapidly rising real costs
(with an import cost basic dynamic) maxes it seem to be less operational tha- 
it is.
The structural changes in respect to rental housing are clearly partial in 
result. They are to the benefit of one above average income group (the tenants 
of Registrar of Buildings accommodation) at the expense of another - on svera'-e 
somewhat higher - above average income group. The balance of the public sector 
housing programme is directed a) to public sector officials (as discussed earlier) 
b) to wage earners (minimum through lower salary), and c) to peasants (v4  ^
village or individual improvement loans). Despite the substantial resources o-* 
the Workers and Peasants Housing Development Fund, 1 c1 is the smallest and -he 
related J.ow cost housing loans to urban wage earners supervising fundi builders 
not much larger, because the Housing Bank has not developed viable ways of 
channeling funds, and no "modern” housing body public or private (the Natio- ' 
Housing Corporation is bettor than most low income country institutions in -"is 
regard) can compete with the "informal" (or small scale, or modified traditional 
or fundi) sector in house cost, nor build and rent at rates consistent with 
what a minimum wage earner can afford and corporate solvency.
What has kept urban rent3 for low income groups relatively low (and apparently 
rising le3s,or no more rapidly than, prices in general) is structural but not 
normally seen in terms of income distribution or prevention of exploitation.
It is the fact that houses built on unsurveyed land unless in the route of a 
major project will not in fact be bulldozed, can ultimately get a right of 
occupancy, are seen as having a claim on basic services and can be built at 
costs resulting inrents low income groups can pay. Unfortunately the inability 
(or professional unwillingness?) of Lands to do rough surveys marking streets 
and sites for schools, parks etc and to issue short term rights of occupancy 
promptly and more or less on request (as the 1974 Act envisages) means th. i 
while'such housing is reasonably cheap and secure, and tends to be u; r.. . 
and to acquire services over time, it develops on unplanned (or villu circle
planned) layouts which sake road, water, school, park (football pitch) location 
later difficult, and without any public service knowledge of its growth or 
location, which retards orderly provision of services.
5iLargely external controls or checks range from rent control and workers committees 
to anti corruption units and Party p r o b e s . W h i l e  effective to a degree at 
highlighting specific abuses in specific cases, they have probably been less 
effective than the structural changes. This may be an unfair interpretation 
since these controls have - except for the first two - been used most since 
1974 during a perido of increasing opportunities for abuse. Certainly corruption 
is and is seen to be greater than in 1974. Further, it is doubtful whether 
organised control bodies are as effective in identifying and acting on cases as 
complaints through other channels. Price Commission initiatives in 1980 and 
State House action in 1981 (both after direct complaints from individuals) 
seem to have had a substantial impact in Mwanza, but neither went via police 
or anti corruption channels and - more worrying structurally - neither went 
via Regional governmental or Party channels either because those with grievances 
felt that those engaged in corruption either controlled or could block those 
channels.
Controls over private health practice - phased out over 1976-80 except for 
licensed non-profit bodies - and private education - more tightly regulated and 
limited in expansion from 1978 - have more complex rationale. Private practice 
doctors were among the highest income Tanzanians. What they sold was a basic 
service. Either they grossly exploited the poor, or by catering for the less
poor, reduced support for the public sector health services' improvement - or
both. As the sector was small the phaseout was fairly simple.
Private education - basically secondary - poses greater problems. Secondary 
education is a key to earning a high income (even if it is not adequate to
assure that result). The public system is selective because its size is
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limited to numbers perceived as needed by the economy and society (- a: -- ...
which, incidentally, though in the Tanzanian case not intentionally, sustains 
salary levels). Therefore, middle and upper middle income parents not in ether 
respects antagonistic to egalitarianism or socialism, do seek to improve their 
childrens' life chances by securing private school places for them. At the 
same time, these schools tend to produce graduates in surplus, net shortage, 
personpower areas. Control rather than abolition raises less political and 
social problems in the short term, but can be said to face the longer term issues 
only if it halts private sector expansion and ultimately phases the existing
private into the public sector.
Productivity Raising Approaches
Programmes designed to raise the productivity of low income peasants a..a .n^iso-s 
can be grouped in three broad clusters:
a. basic sorvicos;
b. rural inputs;
c. small industry promotion.
The first has been examined above and the second in tw0 - 0,1 - -cu-
ture. Their total impact on income and on poverty eradicate- ..as 
stantial. So has their contribution to reduction of inequal-tj on t..e
purse" (access to public services) front. But it is less cles- »..£
have been significant in reducing inequality of earned income o* ....
Education beyond primary level has made possible rapid iam»n.a. £ o..
, .. -M lied by expatriates at development not possible had the posts needed to be 3
expatriate costs), but in so doing it has created the upper wage _r._ .,
portion of tho income distribution. Rural credit, subsidies -o -nj .
/industrial crops ana within extension services have tended to be biased to exporw AU“
them to coffee and tobacco, which - for the producers accounting
.«r-ncre Vhlle this bias has of output - provide incomes above the Tanzanian average.
, , . ,flncinn and seeas — it hasbeen sharply eroded - especially in respect to exten-ieu
inDUt provision/subsidy by no means been eliminated. Therefore, while rural i y
reduces urban/rural inequality and absoluto povorty, it may — on balance -
53
increase intrarural inequality.
Small industries development has received far less resources than rural inputs.
Its expansion during the 1970's has been parallel to expansion of craft and small 
54
industry output. How instrumental it has been in that Increase is less clear. 
General reduction of competing imports has been at least as significant.
Further increases in semi-skilled and artisanal personnel and reductions in 
alternative opportunities for private investment have been conducive to the
expansion.
Host small and craft industries are private sector. The bulk of the employees 
and craft proprietors receive moderately below (many self-employed craftsmen) 
to moderately above (some self employed craftsmen, wage employees) the minimum 
wage. Expansion of this body of employed/self employed does reduce urban income 
inequality. However, especially given the higher incomes of proprietors, it is 
doubtful whether this impact is significant. It should bo noted that SIDO 
and small industry promotion generally have been seen not as egaliterian but 
as production generating and local resource using policies. If a substantial 
village industry sector were to develop this would reduce urban/rural and 
national inequality but, because it would almost certainly be centred in a 
minority of villages which were rarely the poorest, would probably increase 
intra rural inequality.
As with the possible increases in inequality resulting from post-primary 
education, those potentially resulting from small industry expansion are not 
the result of decreasing one group's income to benefit another. Therefore, 
their promotion on production, Tanzanianisation and national economic 
integration grounds is not inherently inconsistent with a goal of egalitarianism. 
However, they do not directly contribute toward it.
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Toward An Incomes Policy?
Tanzania has - with the partial exception of 1974-75 - never had ar exp’ici* 
coordinated income distribution policy. The instruments from which s--h 
policy - ie an Annual Incomes Plan - could be constructed exist So do *he 
absolute poverty reduction and inequality reduction goals which cou’d bo u-ed 
as a framework for target setting. However, despite fairly systematic 
consideration of income distribution results of some (not all) maio- -0u,„e, 
and resource allocation, income distribution planning as such has no* te- 
consolidated as - eg-personpower, foreign exchange or bank credit has been
The nearest approach to such coordination is in the Recurrent Budgetary pro-es-
This is evidently true of fiscal measures - whose impact on income «listr4b"t or.
has been explicitly mentioned in most Budget Speeches from 1969 onward
but is in practice rather broader. Decisions on agricultural prices a-'.-0 on
wages are, in practice, taken over the same period as the fiscal budgetary
decisions and are, to a varying degree, coordinated with them. This was
marked in 1974 when a package of consumer price, gorver price, wage and salarv
tax and expenditure decisions were taken as a unified programme for adjustirg
to world grain and oil price increases and to drought. Protection of low
income groups and - in part consequentially - reduction of inequality were 
55central to that package. However, the precedent has not been repeated.
The apparent reasons for the absence of a coordinated annual plan are prcbably 
five fold:
a. the very severe uncertainty as to agricultural income on weather grounds 
which is not subject to policy alteration;
b. the weakness of much of the relevant data - especially on self employed and 
the private sector more gnerally;
c. the lack of adequate personnel or sustained interest by the Ministry of
Economic Affairs and Development Planning;
d. the vested interests in some instruments - eg grower pric.
resistance to their coordination wirh other decisions;
e. the relative success of the multiple instrument policy as pursued on a semi- 
coordinated basis.
That this explanation consitutes an adequate justification is much less clear.
A coordinated annual planning exercise would make the data gaps and weaknesses 
more generally apparent and - perhaps - generate pressure for, and resource 
allocations toward, improving the data base. Coherent, regular attention to 
the income distribution impact of agricultural prices is badly needed (even if 
it cannot be the sole determinant) and would presumably be easier to achieve 
within an overall income distribution planning (budgeting) framework. The 
Treasury - precisely because its decisions dominate some, but not all, 
distributional instruments - is inherently a second best coordinating body to 
Planning. The lack of attention to non-agricultural self employed incomes and 
to private sector upper wages and salaries which has marked 1967-81 policy 
would be less likely to continue within a more systematic annual planning 
exercise.
